DoS is more than DDoS: algorithmic-complexity attacks
Most people hear ‘DoS’ and picture a flood of traffic. A cheaper denial of service is a single small request that hits super-linear code.
Security researcher · Architect · Consultant
I'm a security researcher, architect and consultant with over half a decade of experience. I find security bugs in open-source software and disclose them to the maintainers. Once the fix and advisory are public, I write up the bug class behind each finding: why it happens, a real case, how to hunt for it in your own code, and how to fix it.
Built so you can skim to the part you need, and leave with one sentence worth remembering.
General bug-class posts: the mental model first, so the findings make sense.
Most people hear ‘DoS’ and picture a flood of traffic. A cheaper denial of service is a single small request that hits super-linear code.
Why IP allow/deny lists keep failing, the common SSRF bypass encodings, and a transition-address class that most SSRF guards still miss.
How to read a fresh security patch for the instances it missed: the four questions I ask, real fix diffs from flyto-core and PhotoBlocks, Semgrep and CodeQL sketches, advisory feeds, and where the method stops working.
A frequent WordPress plugin bug is not SQL injection or XSS but a handler that checks who you are and never what you may do. Covers vertical vs horizontal access, the three request surfaces and the sinks that decide impact.
Polluting Object.prototype does nothing on its own. It becomes a vulnerability only when some other code reads a property it never set (a gadget), and that split decides whether you get XSS, RCE, auth bypass, DoS, or nothing, and how to fix it.
Why one escaping function never fits every place you print data, how auto-escaping templates still leave holes, the DOM-XSS source-to-sink model, mutation XSS and blind XSS, filter-bypass encodings, and why a Contributor-level stored XSS in a CMS is a privilege-escalation bug.
Prepared statements and ORMs removed the classic string-glued SQL injection, not the bug class. A taxonomy (in-band, blind, time-based, out-of-band, second-order) and the places it still hides in modern code.
A workflow file is code that runs with your secrets, and a pull request title, a fork’s package.json, or a poisoned cache can be the input that drives it. This post covers injection sinks, privileged triggers, token scope, poisoning, self-hosted runners and SHA pinning.
Loading a pickle, a PyTorch checkpoint, an unsafe YAML document, a Java object stream or a PHP string runs a program the sender wrote. The same gadget-chain bug class shows up in five runtimes, and ML infrastructure does it on network bytes in many places.
Real findings, each with a public advisory. Root cause, proof, detection and fix.
A lazy quantifier hunting for a PEM END marker turns many unmatched BEGIN headers into quadratic work: about seven seconds of blocked CPU from a 560 KB input.
The TypeScript port of an agent server got a CVE and a fix for binding to every interface with no auth. The Python port kept the same defaults, so the documented quickstart served agent system prompts and agent invocation to anyone on the network.
jsonwebtoken built an HMAC verifier from a zero-length key, so a token signed with an empty key verified. Root cause, PoC, detection and fix.
An SSRF guard that decoded one IPv6 form trusted all the others. How an internal IPv4 address hidden inside an IPv6 one slips past the filter, and when it actually reaches its target.
An AJAX handler guarded only by a nonce that every logged-in customer receives let any Subscriber delete the shipping labels and tracking records of any order in the store.
A REST permission check that really asked ‘is this user logged in?’ let any Subscriber read every customer’s bookings, and fixing one controller left the discounts route open.
A gallery setting cleaned with sanitize_text_field() kept its double quotes and landed raw inside an HTML attribute, letting a Contributor plant JavaScript that runs in an administrator’s browser.
An earlier patch escaped the uploadid in one query and missed the next one, leaving an unauthenticated SQL injection reachable from a nopriv upload handler.
An earlier SSRF fix skipped one module, and a credential check was mistaken for an SSRF guard, so an automated gate reported the module as protected while it fetched any URL an attacker chose.
I hunt in open-source libraries, AI and MCP tooling, and web frameworks, and report through GitHub Security Advisories and vendor disclosure channels. The goal of this blog is simple: if you read a post, you should be able to find the same class of bug in your own code before someone else does. More about me.